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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has created an expansive environmental law regime that includes 
both civil and criminal penalties for environmental violators. The criminal portion 
of that regime has just become more complex. In a recent decision, Southern Union 
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court made a significant alteration that affects, 
specifically, criminal fines.
1
 The Southern Union ruling has far reaching effects in 
two common forms of environmental crime fines: (1) fines that involve penalties 
that are measured per day of violation; and (2) fines that are weighed in gain to a 
defendant or loss to society under the Alternative Fines Act.
2
 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Southern Union will have significant ramifications in envi-
ronmental law because it is a constitutional ruling, meaning it will affect both state 
and federal laws.
3
 All this, coupled with the fact that increasing numbers of envi-
ronmental enforcement cases are being pursued criminally by the federal govern-
                                                          
 
 1. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012). 
 2. Bruce Pasfield & Elise Paeffgen, Supreme Court’s Southern Union Decision Helps Level the 
Playing Field for Corporations Subject to Criminal Fines, 13 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM. 
NEWSL. 2, 3, 5–6 (2012),  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eecc/201208_eecc.authcheckdam
.pdf. 
 3. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating the ruling applies to both federal and state laws). 
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In effect, the Southern Union court added another layer of complexity to al-
ready complicated environmental crime cases, dramatically changing how certain 
cases will be litigated.
5
 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury 
trial guarantees require all facts that increase a defendant’s maximum criminal fine 
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
6
 In effect, this meant that the jury in 
Southern Union had to find a violation on each and every one of 752 days where 
the defendant company was charged with improper storage of mercury because the 
charging statute had a per day fine scheme.
7
 Prior to the ruling, judges were al-
lowed to make factual determinations in sentencing that affected a criminal defend-
ant’s criminal fine, such as determining the number of days where violations had 
occurred.
8
 In effect, Southern Union results in a broad expansion of the jury trial 
requirements in criminal fine cases.
9
 
Through its expansion of jury trial requirements, Southern Union creates a se-
ries of new problems and challenges for the justice system. Five of these problems 
and challenges will be discussed in this article. The first challenge that the article 
will discuss is Southern Union’s requirement that indictments and verdicts specify 
more facts relating to criminal fines than trial judges had previously required.
10
 In a 
case like Southern Union, this could be as complicated as making a count for each 
day of violation, totaling 752 counts. A second challenge this article discusses is 
questions relating to the amount of inferences a jury can make regarding those 
facts.
11
 This aspect of the article can be stated as a hypothetical. When Southern 
Union is remanded, will the jury have to hear evidence of a violation on each of the 
752 days, or could they infer a violation took place over 752 days after seeing evi-
dence of a violation on just a handful of days? A third challenge the article will 
                                                          
 4. See Beth S. Gotthelf & Joseph E. Richotte, More Environmental Cases Are Going Criminal: 
How to Protect and Prepare-the Value of Audits and Compliance Programs, 13 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & 
CRIMES COMM. NEWSL. 2, 9 (2012) 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eecc/201208_eecc.authcheckdam
.pdf (“Those operating in industries highly regulated by federal, state, and local environmental protection 
agencies have seen an increase in the number of violations being escalated from administrative notices of 
violations and fines, or even civil penalties, to criminal prosecutions.”). 
 5. See United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting Don R. Clay, 
EPA Assistant Administrator of the EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, as saying 
“RCRA is a regulatory cuckoo land of definition . . . I believe we have five people in the agency who un-
derstand what ‘hazardous waste’ is.”); see also David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: 
The Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 
1223, 1224 (2009) (stating environmental laws and regulations are “often are mind-numbingly complex”);  
see also Walter D. James III, Environmental Crimes Trials – More Complicated Now?, ENVTL. CRIMES 
BLOG (June 22, 2012, 8:57 AM), 
http://environmentalblog.typepad.com/environmental_crimes_blog/2012/06/environmental-crimes-trials-
more-complicated-now.html. 
 6. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 7. Id. at 2352. 
 8. E.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009). 
 9. Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 256, 266 (2012) (stating that “by extending Apprendi to 
a characteristically regulatory sanction imposed against an institutional defendant, Southern Union suggests 
that if the defendant is entitled to a jury for the underlying conviction, then he should be entitled to a jury on 
facts that determine all accompanying penalties.”). 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
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discuss is the effect Southern Union has on ever complicated environmental crime 
trials.
12
 A fourth challenge this article will discuss is a consequence of Southern 
Union. That is the case may, in effect, result in more prosecutions for individual 
liability that results in jail sentences because of the additional complications South-
ern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines.
13
 Fifth and finally, the article will 
discuss whether Southern Union has any application to civil penalties.
14
 This article 
will discuss these new problems and challenges in the context of environmental 
enforcement at both the state and federal level. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union, it is necessary 
to examine the prior Supreme Court case law that led to Southern Union. Prior to 
Southern Union, the Supreme Court only required juries to determine all facts that 
increased a criminal defendant’s term of incarceration—not criminal fines.
15
 In 
fact, in a previous case the Supreme Court stated in dicta that applying such a rule 
to criminal fines “surely would cut the rule loose from its moorings.”
16
 However, in 
Southern Union the court disavowed its own dicta and applied the rule to criminal 
fines.
17
 The ruling in Southern Union was not novel. In fact, it was only the exten-




In Apprendi, the Supreme Court laid out its standard for judicial fact finding 
that leads to a determination of a criminal defendant’s term of incarceration.
19
 
There, the Court held that the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, along with the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees, 
require that all facts that increase a defendant’s maximum term of incarceration be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
20
 The facts in Apprendi involved a 
New Jersey defendant who was accused of discharging a gun into the home of an 
African American family that had recently moved into his all-white neighbor-
hood.
21
 He was indicted on charges for alleged shootings and possession of various 
weapons.
22
 Nothing in the indictment, however, referred to a hate crime or a crime 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
 14. See infra Part III.E. 
 15. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351–52 (2012). 
 16. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009). 
 17. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (stating “[w]e think the statement is at most ambiguous, 
and more likely refers to the routine practice of judges’ imposing fines from within a range authorized by 
jury-found facts. Such a practice poses no problem under Apprendi because the penalty does not exceed 
what the jury’s verdict permits. In any event, our statement in Ice was unnecessary to the judgment and is 
not binding.”) (citations omitted). 
 18. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 553 (2000). 
 19. Id. at 552–53. 
 20. Id. at 466. 
 21. Id. at 469. 
 22. Id.  




 Later, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm 
for an unlawful purpose.
24
 At sentencing the judge found the crime “was motivated 
by racial bias,” and enhanced the sentence on a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.
25
 Though the New Jersey legislature had previously made the hate crime 
enhancement a sentencing factor, the jury never made a factual finding that the 
crime was motivated by racial bias.
26
 On appeal, it was held that the judge’s finding 
of racial bias was permissible because it was within the legislature’s power to make 
the hate crime enhancement a sentencing factor.
27
 However, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the trial judge’s factual determination that the crime 
was motivated by racial bias.
28
 
The Supreme Court had multiple reasons for its reversal. First, the Supreme 
Court wanted to ensure that terms of incarceration were based on facts proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
29
 The Court found the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stand-
ard necessary because criminal convictions result in the most severe of legal sanc-
tions—a loss of liberty and a criminal stigma.
30
 Second, the Court wanted to pre-
serve the jury’s role in criminal convictions as reflected in the Sixth Amendment 
and historical practices.
31
 The Court based its reasoning on the small amount of 
discretion that judges historically had in felony sentencing, stating “the English 
trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sen-
tencing.”
32
 Thus, the Court stated the Apprendi rule was a reflection of the large 
role that juries play in criminal trials, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
33
 
Finally, the Court argued that the simple interests of justice mandate that a criminal 
defendant should not be treated differently on a matter of procedure—whether an 
enhancement is a sentencing factor or a trial factor.
34
 Thus, the Court stated: 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed: “The law threatens certain pains if 
you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new motive for not 
doing them. If you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the pains in order 
that its threats may continue to be believed.” New Jersey threatened Ap-
prendi with certain pains if he unlawfully possessed a weapon and with 
additional pains if he selected his victims with a purpose to intimidate 
them because of their race. As a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious 
that the procedural safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from unwar-
ranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has sin-
gled out for punishment. Merely using the label “sentence enhancement” 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
 25. Id. at 471. 
 26. Id. at 471. 
 27. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 28. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. 
 29. Id. at 477. 
 30. Id. at 484. 
 31. Id. at 476. 
 32. Id. at 479 (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the 
French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, 36–37 (A. Schioppa 
ed. 1987)). 
 33. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518. 
 34. Id. at 476.  
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This line of reasoning was taken up by the Southern Union court, which ex-
panded the Apprendi rule from criminal incarcerations to both criminal incarcera-
tions and criminal fines.
36
 
B. Southern Union 
A circuit split on whether or not to apply Apprendi to criminal fines was re-
solved in Southern Union.
37
 Initially, the First Circuit did not apply the Apprendi 
rule to criminal fines in Southern Union.
38
 Instead, the First Circuit relied on dicta 
from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oregon v. Ice.
39
 In that case, the Supreme 
Court stated that applying Apprendi to criminal fines “surely would cut the rule 
loose from its moorings.”
40
 Following this dicta, the First Circuit asserted that “no 
traditional jury function had been curtailed” by allowing judges to make factual 
findings pertaining to fines in sentencing.
41
 
The First Circuit’s ruling conflicted with rulings from the Second and Seventh 
Circuits.
42
 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Pfaff, held that the Apprendi rule 
did apply to criminal fines.
43
 There, the Second Circuit held the Apprendi rule ap-
plied when a judge made pecuniary loss determinations that increased a defendant’s 
fine, who was charged with tax evasion, from $3 million to $6 million.
44
 The Sec-
ond Circuit held the fine violated Apprendi because doubling the defendant’s crim-
inal fine based on facts that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury 
“affected the appellant's substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of the 
proceedings.”
45
 Another circuit that applied Apprendi to criminal fines was the 
Seventh Circuit.
46
 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. LaGrou Distribution 
Systems Inc., held a district judge had “no authority to sentence” a defendant corpo-
                                                          
 35. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 40 (M. 
Howe ed. 1963). 
 36. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352–53. 
 37. Id. at 2349. 
 38. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. 
Ct. 2344 (2012). 
 39. Id. at 34. 
 40. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009). 
 41. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d at 34. 
 42. See United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. LaGrou Dis-
trib. Sys. Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 43. Pfaff, 619 F.3d at 175. 
 44. Id. at 174–75. The judge made this determination under the Alternative Fines Act. Id. The 
Alternative Fines Act states: “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results 
in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater 
of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would undu-
ly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).  Thus, the Alternative Fines 
Act allows fines above the statutory maximum in amounts equal to twice the economic gain or loss of the 
offense of the conviction. Id. 
 45. Pfaff, 619 F.3d at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Marcus, 
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)). 
 46. United States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys. Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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ration to a $1 million criminal fine absent a jury finding that the crime justified a 
departure from the default statutory fine amount of $500,000.
47
 There, the court 
stated: 
[T]he problem is that the district court did not give a special interrogatory 
with the jury instructions or verdict form asking the jury to find a loss 
amount. Thus, at sentencing, it was the district judge using a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard to find the loss amount, not a jury finding 
loss amount beyond a reasonable doubt.
48
 
These different court rulings set the stage for the Supreme Court to decide the new 
constitutional question presented in Southern Union. 
The facts in Southern Union exemplify an old and common problem where 
low-income and minority communities often have a high concentration of facilities 
that produce hazardous chemicals.
49
 The Southern Union case began when Rhode 
Island youths broke into the building and took 140 pounds of mercury, played with 
it, and spread it around their homes in a local apartment complex.
50
 All in all, 150 
residents of five apartment buildings were displaced for two months while the mer-
cury in their building was cleaned up.
51
 Although all of the residents, who were 
tested for mercury, did not meet the standards for hazardous exposure, some resi-
dents had elevated mercury exposure blood levels.
52
 
These events precipitated from the improper storage of the mercury by a natu-
ral gas company called the Southern Union Company.
53
 Southern Union was stor-
ing the mercury in a dilapidated and unguarded facility located in a residential area 
with a frequent history of break-ins and vandalism.
54
 The actual mercury was 
“‘stored’ in doubled plastic bags placed in kiddie pools on the floor of [a] brick 
building.”
55
 Ample evidence from company letters and meetings indicated the 
company knew the mercury was being stored in a dangerous manner.
56
 At trial, the 
Southern Union Company was convicted of knowingly storing hazardous mercury 
in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
57
 However, 
the company appealed the trial judge’s determination that the violation took place 
over 762 days.
58
 Though the trial court set a maximum fine at $38.1 million and an 
actual fine at $6 million, the Supreme Court reversed the fine because the district 
                                                          
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Dominique R. Shelton, The Prevalent Exposure of Low Income and Minority Communi-
ties to Hazardous Materials: The Problem and How to Fix It, 32 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 1, 1 (1997); 
Valerie J. Phillips, Have Low Income, Minorities Been Left Out of the Environmental Cleanup?, 38 
ADVOCATE 16, 18–19 (1995) (pointing out the danger to migratory farm workers that can result from chem-
ical exposure). 
 50. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. 
Ct. 2344 (2012). 
 51. Id. at 24. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 22. 
 55. Id. 
 56. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d at 23. 
 57. United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201, 205–207 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d, 630 F.3d 
17 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). 
 58. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
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judge engaged in judicial fact finding that went beyond the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment as laid out by the Apprendi rule, which had previously only been ap-
plied to criminal incarcerations.
59
 Thus, the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi 
rule to include criminal fines, requiring that juries make all factual findings that 
increase a criminal defendant’s criminal fine.
60
 In applying the rule, the court stated 
their ‘“core concern’ is to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that war-
rant punishment for a specific statutory offense.’ That concern applies whether the 
sentence is a criminal fine, imprisonment, or death.”
61
 Thus, the court made a clear 
rule that all facts that affect a criminal defendant’s sentence—whether a term of 
incarceration or a criminal fine—must be determined by the jury.
62
 
In Southern Union the Supreme Court backed up its ruling with historical 
analysis “suggesting that English juries were required to find facts that determined 
the authorized pecuniary punishment.”
63
 The Court stated the rule that juries must 
determine facts relating to criminal fines “is an application of the ‘two longstanding 
tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence’” that Apprendi and the Sixth 
Amendment were based upon.
64
 First, “the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a 
defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of 
his equals and neighbors.’”
65
 Second, “an accusation which lacks any particular 
fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is . . . no accusation within 
the requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason.”
66
 The 
Court’s ruling followed the arguments of amicus briefs arguing that applying the 
Apprendi rule to criminal fines was a reaffirmation of the traditional role of the jury 
and vital to enforcing the Sixth Amendment.
67
 
Thus, the Court stated the ruling preserved the historic jury function in “de-
termining whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”
68
 As such, the ruling followed a trend in Supreme Court cases 
that applied the Apprendi rule “to a variety of sentencing schemes that allow[ed] 
judges to find facts that increase[ed] a defendant's maximum authorized sen-
tence.”
69
 To support the assertion that the Southern Union case was consistent with 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 2352. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2350 (quoting Ice, 555 U.S. at 170). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2353. 
 64. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Brief of Criminal Procedure Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, S. Un-
ion Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. 11-94), 2012 WL 195309 (arguing “there is consider-
able evidence suggesting that the jury’s role in the colonial period was similar in setting fines as for as-
sessing the length of sentences”); Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, S. 
Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. 11-94), 2011 WL 3664464 (arguing requiring that 
the jury make factual determinations relating to sentencing “is critical to ensuring uniform nationwide en-
forcement of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 68. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163 (2009)). 
 69. Id. 
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prior decisions, the court cited a number of its previous decisions that applied the 
Apprendi rule to various sentencing schemes.
70
 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union can be tied to the govern-
ment’s indictment of the Southern Union Company. Indictments serve as the initial 
pleading in a criminal case and, like other pleadings, they require that the govern-
ment states every element of the charged crime.
71
 The government’s indictment 
was fatal because it did not specify the precise dates where the Southern Union 
Company committed an RCRA violation—a fact that affected the size of the com-
pany’s criminal fine.
72
 The indictment stated the Southern Union Company stored 
hazardous waste in violation of RCRA “[f]rom on or about September 19, 2002 
until on or about October 19, 2004.”
73
 Violations involving knowing transportation 
of waste to an improper facility or knowing treatment, storage, or disposal of waste 
under RCRA are punishable by “[a] fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of 
violation.”
74
 Since, the indictment did not specify the specific dates where a viola-
tion took place, it did not contain all the facts relevant to the Southern Union Com-
pany’s criminal fine.
75
 This lack of specificity in the indictment led to a lack of 
specificity in the jury instructions in the case. The jury instructions defined “on or 
about” by stating: 
You will note that the Indictment charges that some of the offenses were 
committed "on or about" a certain date. The proof need not establish with 
certainty the exact date of the alleged offense. It is sufficient if the evi-
dence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense 
was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged.
76
 
Since the jury was instructed to not establish the dates of violation with exact cer-
tainty, the dates of violation could not have been found on a beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. 
In effect, the lack of specificity in the date of violation opened the door for 
the district judge to have to determine an element of the criminal RCRA violation 
in sentencing—over how many days the violation occurred.
77
 However, the indict-
ment would not have violated the Apprendi rule if, hypothetically, the government 
                                                          
 70. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274–75 (2007) (applying the rule to an elevat-
ed “upper term” of imprisonment); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (imposing the 
rule on a scheme that increased the imprisonment range for defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines that were mandatory at the time); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 229–300 (2004) (applying the 
rule to a scheme that added imprisonment over the “standard range” defined by statute); Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584, 588–589 (2002) (applying the rule to a scheme where the death penalty was authorized upon 
the finding of aggravating sentencing factors); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466–469 (2000) 
(applying the rule to an extended prison term based on defendant violating a “hate crime” statute). 
 71. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL, at VII-4 (1991). 
 72. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
 73. Indictment, S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. CR 07 134 T) 2007 
WL 3123420. 
 74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(7)(B) (West 2013). 
 75. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
 76. Jury Instructions at 13, United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201 (2012) (D.R.I. 
2009) (Cr. No. 07–134 S), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu/judges/jurycharges/CRdocs/07-
134S%20US%20v%20Southern%20Union.pdf (emphasis added). 
 77. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349. 
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had made a specific charge for each of the 752 days of violation.
78
 Making a charge 
for each day of violation, however, would undoubtedly be cumbersome. Luckily, 
alternative ways to charge an environmental crime that has a per day fine exist and 
are discussed in subsequent sections of this article.
79
 
The ruling in Southern Union had many opponents because it gave rise to 
many new complications in criminal fine trials. One source of opposition came 
from the government.
80
 The government provided multiple arguments against ex-
tending Apprendi to criminal fines.
81
 First, the government argued that requiring 
juries to determine facts relating to fines caused confusion, which would require 
additional expert testimony.
82
 Second, the government argued that extending Ap-
prendi might prejudice defendants because there would be situations where they 
would have to simultaneously argue they did not violate a statute and argue that 
their violations were minimal.
83
 Finally, the government argued extending Appren-
di would be impractical because fines often rely on facts that may be unknowable 
before a trial ends.
84
 Such arguments highlight the complications that Southern 
Union created for the government in criminal fine cases. 
Another example of opposition to the ruling in Southern Union came from the 
dissenters in the case.
85
 Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito all joined in a fifteen-
page dissent to the opinion.
86
 The dissenters took issue with the majority in many 
places.
87
 Notably, the dissenters argued Southern Union was bad for defendants in 
three ways.
88
 First, they argued the opinion would negatively affect defendants be-
cause in many cases they would have to make two conflicting arguments: (1) that 
they did not commit a crime and (2) that they only committed it for a small period 
of time.
89
 Second, the dissenters argued the ruling would allow new evidence to 
come in at trial to prove daily violations that otherwise would have been prejudicial 
to the defendant.
90
 They pointed out that the company in Southern Union had the 
court exclude prejudicial evidence of the removal of the mercury to a local apart-
ment complex, but under the new scheme such evidence might now come into trial 
as it would aid the government in proving daily violations.
91
 Finally, the dissenters 
                                                          
 78. See infra Part III.A. 
 79. See infra Part III.A. 
 80. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2356. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2356–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 2370–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 2370 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. This is commonly referred to as the 403 balancing test. Id. The dissenters 
were recognizing the fact that the ruling in Southern Union would allow the prosecutor to bring in addition-
al evidence to prove daily violations. 132 S. Ct. 2344 at 2370–71. Such evidence could have taken the form 
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argued that further complicating the trial requirements in cases involving criminal 
fines would only create more plea deals and less actual trials.
92
 They argued a jus-
tice system where “plea bargaining is not some adjunct to the criminal justice sys-
tem [but] is the criminal justice system” is problematic because prosecutors are 
advocates and not neutral adjudicators.
93
 Thus, the dissenters stated the opinion 
would only perpetuate a justice system where ninety-seven percent of federal con-
victions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are plea bargains.
94
 
Despite all these increased complications in environmental crime, Southern 
Union is a correct step in guaranteeing fundamental rights to criminal defendants 
charged with a criminal fine. As such, Southern Union is a correct step towards 
guaranteeing fundamental jury rights in environmental cases. It is a reaffirmation of 
the fundamental Sixth Amendment right, and the fact that the criminal stigma 
should only be imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In Southern Union, the Supreme Court was correct in making the law reflect 
the fact that there is certainly a far larger stigma in a $50 million criminal fine than 
a $10,000 criminal fine. With an understanding of the complications, there still are 
many workable options to charge criminal environmental fines. 
Despite all the arguments against Southern Union, there is merit in the argu-
ment that that the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights to criminal defend-
ants charged with a criminal fine. Southern Union is a reaffirmation of the funda-
mental Sixth Amendment right and fact that the criminal stigma should only be 
imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
95
 
Though a term of criminal incarceration is undoubtedly different from a criminal 
fine, there are some similarities. The big similarity is that both criminal fines and 
terms of incarceration carry a criminal stigma.
96
 Indeed, the larger the fine or term 
of incarceration, the larger the stigma.
97
 Just as a one month term of incarceration 
has less of a stigma than a life sentence, a $50,000 fine has less of a stigma than a 
$7 million fine. What the Supreme Court ruled in Southern Union reflects this idea. 




                                                                                                                                       
of evidence showing individual children playing with the mercury on specific days—something that would 
have been very prejudicial to the Southern Union Company. Such hypothetical evidence would be prejudi-
cial because some jurors might have a tendency to want to punish the company for exposing children to 
mercury. However, the evidence would also be very probative because it is necessary for the government to 
prove daily violations. Under the 403 balancing test the evidence would only not come into trial if its preju-
dicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403.  Thus, such hypothetical evi-
dence would probably be admissible under Southern Union where it may not previously been admissible.  
 92. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2371 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 94. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 96. Developments in the Law, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1300, 1301 (1979). 
 97. Id. at 1305. 
 98. See infra Part II.C; see generally Developments in the Law, supra note 96. 
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C. Overview of Criminal and Civil Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
In order to understand the ruling in Southern Union it is important to under-
stand what types of criminal and civil enforcement options the government can use 
to ensure environmental compliance. One of the principal choices the government 
must make, and perhaps most important, is whether it should pursue criminal or 
civil liability against a defendant.
99
 Other choices exist for the government when a 
defendant is either an individual or a corporate entity.
100
 It makes a substantial dif-
ference if a defendant is a corporate entity or an individual because corporate enti-
ties cannot serve jail time, whereas individuals can.
101
 Though the government can 
pursue both criminal and civil liability against a corporation, corporate criminal 
enforcement is substantially different from individual enforcement.
102
 However, in 
certain circumstances the government can make individual corporate officers liable, 
thus, taking advantage of a form of corporate enforcement that is similar to indi-
vidual enforcement actions.
103
 These types of enforcement options, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of enforcement of such options, are discussed below. 
a. Corporate Defendants 
One type of environmental enforcement is corporate enforcement, which in-
volves a case brought by the government against a corporate entity. In such en-
forcement actions the government can bring either a civil or criminal case, or both a 
criminal and civil case against a corporation.
104
 Such corporate enforcement is 
common and is the type of enforcement that was pursued in Southern Union. Be-
cause it is impossible to put a corporation in jail, in corporate criminal cases the 
government, instead, penalizes the corporation through criminal penalties and fines. 
Such criminal enforcement of environmental laws has real-world consequences for 
corporations in two ways. First, enforcement results in fines and penalties imposed 
by the law.
105
 Second, enforcement results in “reputational penalties” that lead 
businesses to lose portions of their market shares.
106
 These “allegations or charges 
that a firm violated environmental regulations correspond to economically mean-
ingful and statistically significant losses in the firm’s share values.”
107
 Such “repu-
                                                          
 99. See Henry Klementowicz et al., Environmental Crimes, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 545 
(2011). 
 100. See EPA, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 6  (2011), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-overview-2011.pdf. 
 101. See id. at 4 (quoting James Strock, former EPA Assistant Administrator for enforcement). 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). 
 104. See, e.g., Julie Cart, BP Faces Civil Trial Over Gulf Oil Spill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/19/nation/la-na-bp-trial-20130220 (stating “[h]aving just paid $4 billion 
to settle criminal charges, BP now risks a [civil] fine of as much as $17 billion in the trial set to begin next 
week.”). 
 105. See, e.g., S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352 (reversing the trial court’s imposition of a 6 mil-
lion dollar fine). 
 106. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Em-
pirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 666–68 (2005). 
 107. Id. at 653–55. 
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tational penalties” result from both civil and criminal enforcement, but criminal 
enforcement creates more of a stigma, tending to result in greater “reputational 
penalties.”
108
 Civil enforcement, on the other hand, causes a predictable amount of 
economic damage to a corporation through a fixed fine.
109
 However, it lacks the 
stigma of a criminal conviction that can be a powerful deterrent.
110
 The scope of 
this paper is not broad enough to fully discuss the debate that ensues regarding civil 
and criminal enforcement of environmental laws, but a brief overview is necessary 
to fully understand the ruling in Southern Union.
111
 
To understand corporate criminal liability it is necessary to look at the legal 
framework that is used to hold a corporate entity criminally liable. The doctrine of 
corporate criminal liability is rooted in respondeat superior, also known as vicari-
ous liability.
112
 Through vicarious liability the acts and intent of a corporation’s 
agents are automatically imputed to the corporation if the agent is acting in the 
scope of her employment for the benefit of the corporation.
113
 Thus, it is possible 
for even the criminal acts of low-level employees to be attributable to a corpora-
tion.
114
 This sort of liability may even be possible in cases where a corporation may 
genuinely pursue environmental compliance.
115
 Such corporate criminal liability 
gives rise to a controversial area of law with many opponents.
116
 
Opponents of corporate criminal liability offer many criticisms. They point 
out the inconsistencies of holding an entity vicariously responsible for acts that it 
may not condone.
117
 Instead, opponents suggest civil penalties provide a more pre-
cise amount of economic punishment than criminal penalties.
118
 The idea is that 
civil penalties result in a precise amount of economic loss to a corporation—the 
amount of the civil fine.
119
 Conversely, these opponents argue criminal penalties 




On the other side, those in favor of corporate criminal responsibility have 
made many arguments. As mentioned before, proponents of corporate criminal 
liability argue criminal sanctions for corporations offer a stigma that is a powerful 
                                                          
 108. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 
1506 (2007) (stating “the hammer of corporate criminal liability should remain in the toolkit of responses to 
serious corporate misconduct” and prosecutors should not have “less leverage than usual in dealing with the 
best educated, most sophisticated, and most well represented class of defendants.”). 
 109. V.S. Khanna, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532–34 (1996) (making the case that the economic effects of a criminal stigma on a 
corporation are unpredictable and, in contrast, civil penalties offer a more preferable way of punishing a 
corporation because they cause a precise amount of harm). 
 110. See Beale, supra note 108. 
 111. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34. 
 112. Klementowicz, supra note 99, at 548.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Ved P. Nanda, Chapter 2 Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is A New Ap-
proach Warranted?, 9 IUS GENTIUM 63, 65 (2011). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See generally Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34. 
 117. Nanda, supra note 114, at 65 (stating “because corporations cannot act on their own or form 
criminal intent, there is no theoretical justification for the doctrine”). 
 118. Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34. 
 119. Khanna, supra note 109. 
 120. Khanna, supra note 109. 
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tool for prosecutors to use to deter corporate misconduct.
121
 In fact, the EPA has a 
policy to charge environmental violations criminally to provide maximum deter-
rence, pointing out the fact that criminal charges are filed against sixty-seven per-
cent of violators.
122
 Another governmental agency, the Department of Justice, pro-
vides the following rational for corporate criminal liability: 
Corporations should not be treated leniently because of their artificial na-
ture nor should they be subject to harsher treatment. Vigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers, where appropri-
ate, results in great benefits for law enforcement and the public, particular-
ly in the area of white collar crime. Indicting corporations for wrongdoing 
enables the government to be a force for positive change of corporate cul-
ture, and a force to prevent, discover, and punish serious crimes.
123
 
In particular, the DOJ reasons there is more reason to indict a corporation in 
many environmental crime cases because there is often “a substantial risk of great 
public harm” with environmental crimes, which are often public welfare crimes.
124
 
The government’s emphasis on criminal environmental corporate enforcement 
shows such criminal enforcement will remain a fixture in environmental enforce-
ment.
125
 Governmental agencies seek corporate criminal enforcement because it 
results in greater protection for the public from environmental violations that can 
have immense public impacts.
126
 
b. Individual Defendants 
There are several options available to the government through individual en-
forcement of environmental crimes.
127
 Criminal enforcement of environmental 
                                                          
 121. Beale, supra note 108, at 1506. 
 122. EPA, supra note 100, at 6 (stating “corporate managers will think twice about deliberately 
breaking the law if they understand that they face incarceration and personal criminal fines for criminal 
conduct, rather than consequences that will be borne solely by the company”). 
 123. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200(A) (2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.200. 
 124. Id. § 9-28.200(B). 
 125. See, e.g., Office of Public Affairs, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deep-
water Horizon Incident, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html (stating “BP Exploration and Production 
Inc. (BP) has agreed to plead guilty to felony manslaughter, environmental crimes, and obstruction of Con-
gress and pay a record $4 billion in criminal fines and penalties for its conduct leading to the 2010 Deep-
water Horizon disaster that killed eleven people and caused the largest environmental disaster in U.S. histo-
ry”). 
 126. See id. 
 127. Specific Idaho federal district court cases show the thrust of federal environmental enforce-
ment in Idaho and the consequences federal enforcement can have on individual Idaho defendants. Idaho 
has multiple examples of individual defendants being convicted for criminal violations of federal environ-
mental laws. Moses is an example of an Idaho case where an individual defendant was sentenced to jail 
time for an environmental violation. United States v. Moses, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1220 (D. Idaho 2009). 
There, a defendant developer was convicted of the excavation and placement of dredge and fill material in a 
stream in violation of the Clean Water Act and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Id. at 1218, 
1220. Another example is Vierstra, where an Idaho dairy farmer had a misdemeanor conviction for a negli-
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crimes can be used as a tool against individual defendants who act alone in their 
crime as well as individual defendants who are in a position in a corporation that is 
responsible for the crime. Individual enforcement is commonly believed to result in 
greater deterrence for environmental crime because it comes with the threat of jail 
time or loss of personal assets.
128
 In fact, the EPA prefers individual enforcement 
because it provides greater deterrence for environmental crime.
129
 A recent empha-
sis in individual enforcement has led to about seventy percent individual enforce-
ment and thirty percent criminal enforcement by the EPA.
130
 
One area where individual defendants may face criminal liability involves the 
Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine. Through this doctrine prosecutors can 
hold individual corporate officers responsible for both criminal and civil violations 
of environmental laws.
131
 Importantly, the doctrine only extends to responsible 
corporate officers, not mere corporate shareholders.
132
 In United States v. Park, the 
Supreme Court outlined the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine.
133
 There, the 
Court stated “the Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces 
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant 
had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either 
to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct the violation complained of, 
and that he failed to do so.”
134
 Addressing concerns over the strict liability charac-
teristics of the doctrine, the Court stated the corporate officer has a duty to exercise 
“the highest standard of foresight and vigilance” and that a breach of this duty has a 
high level of blameworthiness and culpability.
135
 
Though the doctrine was originally created under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, the “doctrine’s most important field of application . . . has become 
liability under environmental statutes on both the federal and state level.”
136
 Under 
the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine, corporate officers have been subject 
                                                                                                                                       
gent discharge of dairy waste into the water of the United States in violation of the Clean Water Act. United 
States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Idaho 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 3269211 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012). 
Furthermore, another example is King, where an Idaho rancher was convicted of three felony violations of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act and one felony “materially false” statement for injecting waste water into an 
aquifer. United States v. King, 660 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 128. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 100, at 6.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975). The Responsible Corporate Officers 
Doctrine is a way to hold corporate officers personally liable and is distinguishable from the commonly 
used term “piercing the corporate veil,” which is a way to hold corporate shareholders personally liable. 
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998) (summarizing that “the corporate veil may be pierced 
and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would 
otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s 
behalf.”). 
 132. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673–74. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. See also R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of “Intent” and the 
Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 320–22 (1991). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American 
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210–13 (1991) (raising concerns that mental states for environmental crimes 
come close to strict liability). 
 136. Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”--A Critique of the 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 290 (2012). 
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to both civil and criminal liability for environmental crimes.
137
 Indeed, even Con-
gress has embraced the doctrine by amending the Clean Air Act
138
 and the Clean 
Water Act
139
 to include “any responsible corporate officer” in the definition of 
“person.” Critics of the doctrine have, however, argued it has “an eroding effect on 
the element of mens rea”
140




The Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine also applies to civil cases.
142
 
The rationale that a corporate officer will be deterred through monetary penalties 
parallels the idea that incarcerating a corporate officer will result in deterrence.
143
 
And while using the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine—which has elements 
of vicarious liability—may be viewed by some as questionable in the criminal con-
text, these concerns are minimalized in the civil context.
144
 One court stated “the 
rationale for holding corporate officers criminally responsible for acts of the corpo-
ration, which could lead to incarceration, is even more persuasive where only civil 
liability is involved, which at most would result in a monetary penalty.”
145
 Critics 
of the civil application of the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine argue that 
the doctrine should not be applied because the very purpose of incorporating is to 
avoid this sort of civil liability.
146
 However, proponents of civil application say 
individual corporate officers should be held responsible in cases involving public 
health and safety.
147
 Additionally, proponents argue Congress worded many envi-
ronmental statutes to hold individuals, “such as owners and operators of facilities,” 
personally liable irrespective of whether or not they are corporate officers.
148
 
                                                          
 137. Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine or “Responsible 
Relationship” of Corporate Officer to Corporate Violation of Law, 119 A.L.R.5TH 205, § 1[a] (2004). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2012). 
 139. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2012). 
141. Petrin, supra note 136, at 296. 
 141. Petrin, supra note 136, at 300; see also Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminal-
ization of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y. F. 1, 8–9 (2004) (asserting that under the doc-
trine, corporate officers may be held criminally liable on the basis of their position in a company even 
though they have no actual knowledge of the conduct); David C. Fortney, Thinking Outside the “Black 
Box”: Tailored Enforcement in Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1624–25 (2003) (ar-
guing that “we should hesitate before applying strict liability criminal sanctions to corporate officers for the 
malfeasance of their employees”); Thomas Mortell & Michelle Gustavson, The Resurgence of the Respon-
sible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 55 ADVOCATE 32 (2012) (arguing against the Responsible Corporate 
Officers Doctrine in the health care context in Idaho).  
 142. Petrin, supra note 136, at 291. 
 143. United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 
292 (2002). 
 147. Id. at 292–93. 
 148. Id. 
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D. Environmental Laws Affected by Southern Union 
It is important to look at the different statutes that are used in environmental 
crime to understand the effect Southern Union will have on environmental criminal 
enforcement. Because Southern Union only applies to criminal trials, this section 
will only mention criminal portions of environmental statutes—not including civil 
or administrative penalties. It is also important to point out that Southern Union has 
applications outside of environmental law in other areas of white-collar crime,
149
 
but the scope of this article is limited to environmental law. Further, Southern Un-
ion’s application to environmental law is limited to certain environmental statutes. 
Therefore, it is important to delineate what provisions of environmental statutes 
Southern Union affects and give a brief overview of some of the large federal envi-
ronmental crime laws that will be affected by Southern Union. Additionally, be-
cause Southern Union was decided on a constitutional basis, it also applies to state 
laws.
150




The government normally has three options in environmental criminal fine 
cases.
152
 It can either (1) charge under the statute of conviction which may charge 
on a fixed amount or charge on a per-day violation scheme; (2) charge under 18 
U.S.C. § 3571(c), which has a maximum fine of $500,000 for felonies or $200,000 
for misdemeanors; or (3) it can charge under Alternative Fines Act and get a fine 
that is twice the gain or loss resulting from the crime.
153
 Southern Union has appli-
cations in two areas; it has applications if the government chooses to seek a per-day 




Thus, fines under both the Alternative Fines Act and various per-day violation 
statutes are the main types of fines that are affected by Southern Union.
155
 It should 
also be noted that many of the environmental statutes explored in this article are 
expansive and “contain overlapping civil, criminal, and administrative pen-
alt[ies.]”
156
 The article will, however, focus exclusively on the criminal portions of 
these statutes to give an overview of what statutes the ruling in Southern Union 
affected. 
As mentioned above, the Alternative Fines Act was affected by the ruling in 
Southern Union. The Alternative Fines Act allows criminal fines above the statuto-
ry maximum in amounts equal to twice the economic gain or loss of the offense of 
                                                          
 149. Kresta Daly, Southern Union Case has Implications for White Collar Criminal and Civil 
Trials, BARTH, TOZER & DALY LLP (Sept. 26, 2012), http://btdlegal.com/southern-union-case-has-
implications-for-white-collar-criminal-and-civil-trials/. 
 150. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating that the ruling applies to both federal and state 
laws). 
 151. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-117 (West 2013). 
 152. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 153. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 154. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5. 
 155. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5. 
 156. Klementowicz, supra note 99, at 544; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)–(d) (2006) (including 
both civil and administrative penalties in the Clean Air Act for violations of implementation plans and 
criminal penalties for “knowing” violations of implementation plans). 
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 The Alternative Fines Act states: “If any person derives pecuni-
ary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person oth-
er than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice 
the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsec-
tion would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.”
158
 Under the 
Alternative Fines Act it is possible to have a fine in the millions, if not billions, of 
dollars when a statutory maximum may only be a $500,000.
159
 As a result of South-
ern Union, a defendant who is convicted under a per-day violation scheme under 
the Alternative Fines Act will have far more reason to challenge each day of the 
government’s fine demand.
160
 This will make the imposition of criminal fines in-
creasingly difficult and expensive for the government.
161
 However, it is also possi-
ble that evidence used to show fines on each day could be prejudicial for a defend-
ant as explored earlier in this article.
162
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is another statute with 
a criminal environmental provision that was affected by Southern Union. In fact, 
RCRA is the environmental statute that was at issue in Southern Union.
163
 Under 
RCRA, violations involving knowing transportation of waste to an improper facili-
ty or knowing treatment, storage, or disposal of waste under RCRA are punishable 
by “a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation.”
164
 This is the quin-
tessential sort of per-day criminal statutory fine provision that Southern Union af-
fects. 
The Clean Water Act also has per-day criminal fine statutory provisions that 
will be impacted by Southern Union. The Clean Water Act has per day criminal 
fines for both negligent violations and knowing violations.
165
 Negligent violations 
are punishable by “not less than $2,500 [or] more than $25,000 per day of viola-
tion.”
166
 Knowing violations are punishable by fines “of not less than $5,000 nor 
more than $50,000 per day of violation.”
167
 The Alternative Fines Act also may 
apply to any provision of the Clean Water Act and can create higher fines.
168
 Thus, 
the Clean Water Act will be impacted by Southern Union in its per-day fine provi-
sions and its use of the Alternative Fines Act. 
                                                          
 157. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 160. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 161. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 162. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 163. United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d, 630 F.3d 17 
(1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (U.S. 2012). 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2011). 
 165. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006). 
 166. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 167. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
 168. See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 532–34 (4th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the 
Clean Water Act to include the Alternative Fines Act, which subjected the defendant to a Class A misde-
meanor fine of $100,000 per violation instead of the Clean Water Act’s maximum fine of $25,000 per day 
of violation).  
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Another federal statute that will be impacted by Southern Union is the Toxic 
Substance Control Act. Under the Toxic Substance Control Act, a criminal fine for 
a knowing or willful violation involves “a fine of not more than $25,000 for each 
day of violation.”
169
 This is yet another per-day environmental criminal fine that 
Southern Union will impact. 
It is also important to note the ruling in Southern Union applies to both feder-
al and state rulings.
170
 The Court, in Southern Union, held that the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments along with the Sixth Amend-
ment’s notice and jury trial guarantees require that all facts that increase a defend-
ant’s maximum criminal fine be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
171
 
This constitutional holding applies to both federal and state laws.
172
 For example, 
Idaho also has a state per-day statutory provision that will be impacted by Southern 
Union in its environmental quality statute.
173
 In the criminal violations section of 
Idaho’s environmental quality statute, Idaho provides multiple per-day fines.
174
 
These include $1,000 per day for continuing negligence violations; $10,000 per day 
for a violation of “the provisions of the air quality public health or environmental 
protection laws” and a $250,000 per day fine for a crime that “places another per-
son in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
175
 These Idaho per-day 
fines are the types of fines that Southern Union impacts. 
III. PREDICTION ON HOW THESE CASES WILL PROCEED 
Southern Union will undoubtedly change environmental enforcement, and, as 
a result, components of the environmental justice system will have to make adjust-
ments. In particular, Southern Union will change environmental enforcement in 
five areas discussed and analyzed below. These five areas of changes will result in 
new choices for both defendants and the government. The first area of adjustment 
will involve the changes prosecutors will have to make in indictment and verdicts 
as a result of Southern Union.
176
 Next, the second area of change will involve the 
sort of inferences a jury can make in criminal fine cases.
177
 After that there will be a 
third change resulting from the complications Southern Union creates in environ-
mental crime trials, which may tend to encourage more guilty pleas and fewer tri-
als.
178
 After that there will be a fourth adjustment because prosecutors should now, 
more than ever, seek individual sentences involving incarceration in criminal envi-
ronmental cases.
179
 Finally, a fifth legal change could result from the possible ex-
pansion of the Apprendi rule into civil cases.
180
 All these changes, resulting from 
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Southern Union, will result in new challenges and complications in environmental 
crime cases. 
A. Indictment and Verdict Complications 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union was 
tied to the government’s indictment of the Southern Union Company. Indictments 
serve as the initial pleading in a criminal case and, like other pleadings, they require 
that the government state every element of the charged crime.
181
 The government’s 
indictment in Southern Union was fatal because it did not specify the precise dates 
when the Southern Union Company committed a RCRA violation—a fact that af-
fected the size of the company’s criminal fine.
182
 Since the indictment did not spec-
ify the dates when a violation took place, it did not contain all the facts relevant to 
the Southern Union Company’s criminal fine.
183
 In effect, the lack of specificity in 
the dates of violation in the indictment opened the door to a district judge having to 
determine how many days the RCRA violation occurred in sentencing.
184
 However, 
the indictment would not have violated the Apprendi rule if, hypothetically, the 
government had made a specific charge for each of the 752 days of violation.
185
 
Making a charge for each day of violation, however, would undoubtedly be cum-
bersome. 
In most environmental crime cases the government has two options with such 
fines.
186
 It can either (1) charge on a per-day violation scheme to get a fine that is 
cumulatively large or (2) it can charge under the Alternative Fines Act and get a 
fine that is twice the gain or loss resulting from the crime.
187
 
Under the first option, the per-day violation scheme, the government still has 
many choices.
188
 The government could have an indictment that has a count for 
each day of violation or it could charge during a specific time span and include a 
special verdict form on which the jury could specify its findings as to which dates 
the violation occurred over.
189
 It is likely that the government will use the special 
verdict form option in most cases because having a count for each day of violation 
would be too cumbersome.
190
 Such special verdict forms have been recognized as 
an excellent way to have juries deliberate on complex cases.
191
 Thus, “[w]hen mul-
tiple offenses are submitted to a jury, special verdicts are often helpful to an orderly 
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 These verdict forms provide a mechanism for prosecutors 
to get “per-day” convictions and comply with the Sixth Amendment. 
Under the second option, the Alternative Fines Act, the government will be at 
a disadvantage because of Southern Union.
193
 The government would be at a disad-
vantage because it would have to face more scrutiny from the defense in its calcula-
tion to prove gain or loss resulting from the crime.
194
 Defendants will have far more 
reason to challenge the government’s calculation of gain or loss before the jury.
195
 
Under either option, in cases where the government is not certain it can prove 
exact dates of violation or gain or loss resulting from the crime because of limita-
tions in witnesses or reporting, it is likely that Southern Union will place the gov-
ernment at a disadvantage.
196
 In those cases, the government may be better off fol-
lowing some alternative form of liability, such as civil penalties where Southern 
Union doesn’t apply. However, many options still exist and Southern Union will 
not greatly reduce convictions in criminal environmental cases. Indeed, the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice has been treating the Sixth Amendment 
as though it is applicable to criminal fines in anticipation of a case like Southern 
Union and four of its five top antitrust fines imposed in the last quarter century 
have been obtained under the more rigorous standard.
197
 
B. Jury Inferences 
Another area where issues arise under Southern Union involves the types of 
inferences a jury is allowed to make. This issue can be stated as a hypothetical. 
When Southern Union is remanded,
198
 will the jury have to see evidence of a viola-
tion on all 752 days charged, or will the jury be allowed to infer a 752-day violation 
after seeing evidence establishing a violation on a certain number of days? If so, 
how many days are needed to allow the jury to make permissible inferences regard-
ing the number of days where a violation took place? 
Generally, a jury is allowed to “infer, on the basis of [their] reason, experi-
ence and common sense, from one or more established facts, [or] the existence of 
some other fact.”
199
 A jury may base such inferences on their common sense.
200
 
However, because juries make these determinations on a different burden of proof 
standard than judges, Southern Union effectively changed the burden of proof that 
is used in such inferences to a higher standard as discussed below. 
Thus, what Southern Union changed is the burden of proof that is, effectively, 
used in inferences and factual findings involving criminal fines. The Sentencing 
Guidelines do not state which standard of proof is applicable when judges make 
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factual findings during sentencing.
201
 Prior to the Southern Union holding, judges 
were making factual findings in sentencing that increased a criminal defendant’s 
fines on a preponderance of the evidence standard
202
 rather than the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard
203
 employed by juries.
204
 In fact, most circuits used the pre-
ponderance standard.
205
 However, this changed with the ruling in Southern Un-
ion.
206
 In effect, Southern Union raised the government’s burden of proof.
207
 South-
ern Union holds that any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence, including fines, 
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
208
 Thus, South-
ern Union raised the government’s burden of proof in many instances. This is an 
affirmation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in criminal matters. 
C. Complicated Trials 
Another area that Southern Union will change will be the overall complica-
tion of jury trials in criminal environmental cases involving fines.
209
 Additional 
evidence and time will have to be put into such cases. As Justice Breyer pointed out 
in his fifteen-page dissent, further complicating the trial requirements in cases in-
volving criminal fines would only create more plea deals and less actual trials.
210
 
He argued that a justice system where “plea bargaining is ‘not some adjunct to the 
criminal justice system [but] is the criminal justice system’” is problematic because 
prosecutors are advocates and not neutral adjudicators.
211
 Thus, he stated the opin-
ion would only perpetuate a justice system where 97% of federal convictions and 
94% of state convictions are plea bargains.
212
 
This prediction mirrors statistics and comments made about plea bargaining 
and the justice system in other areas. In some federal districts, the plea rate in crim-
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inal convictions has been cited as over 99%.
213
 Thus, some commentators have 
suggested in many cases a prosecutor plays a role as both the prosecutor and final 
adjudicator of a defendant’s case.
214
 Conversely, other commentators have argued 
plea bargaining results in greater trial efficiency and effectively saves the public 
money.
215
 Either way, plea bargaining has taken hold of the criminal justice system 
and is now the most common form of criminal case resolution.
216
 Thus, the concern 
is that Southern Union will serve as yet another incentive to strike a plea bargain 
because of the increased complications of environmental crime cases. 
D. Individual Liability 
Additionally, under Southern Union prosecutors have increased incentives to 
pursue individual liability that results in jail sentences because of the additional 
complications Southern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines.
217
 This is a 
positive result of the ruling because individual enforcement is commonly believed 
to result in greater deterrence for environmental crime since it comes with the 
threat of jail time.
218
 Prosecutors should now, more than ever, pursue individual 
corporate officer responsibility in environmental cases to provide strong disincen-




Such an emphasis on individual enforcement already exists in some govern-
ment agencies and Southern Union simply gives another argument to perpetuate 
this emphasis. For example, the EPA prefers individual enforcement because it 
provides greater deterrence for environmental crime.
220
 A recent emphasis in indi-
vidual enforcement has led to about 70% individual enforcement and 30% criminal 
enforcement by the EPA.
221
 The EPA’s emphasis in individual enforcement shows 
the government can go one step further and achieve greater environmental crime 
deterrence by taking Southern Union as an indication that it should pursue even 
more individual enforcement in such cases. 
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E. Application to Civil Cases 
As a consequence of Southern Union, the government now has more reason 
than ever to seek civil penalties, instead of criminal penalties, because fewer facts 
will have to be found by the jury in civil cases.
222
 In response, it is likely some de-
fendants will argue the Apprendi rule should apply to the determination of facts that 
affect civil fines under various environmental statutes.
223
 Even before Southern 
Union was decided there was argument for applying the Apprendi rule to civil cas-
es.
224
 One area where these arguments have come up is in the context of Securities 
and Exchange Commission civil penalties.
225
 In those cases, defendants are arguing 
Congress’s “civil” label is not determinative and certain “civil” statutes that are 
punitive in nature should be considered criminal for the purpose of constitutional 
protections provided to the defendant.
226
 
This argument follows the Supreme Court’s analysis, which can be seen in 
United States v. Ward.
227
 Under this analysis, a civil statute’s label is not determi-
native because constitutional protections reserved for criminal cases have been ap-
plied to statutes that Congress has labeled “civil.”
228
 The question of whether a 
statute is criminal or civil is a question of statutory construction that is based on a 
two-part analysis.
229
 First, courts look at whether Congress expressly or impliedly 
labeled a statute as criminal or civil.
230
 Second, if Congress has labeled a provision 
as a civil penalty, courts inquire, “further whether the statutory scheme was so pu-
nitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.”
231
 In Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez the Court listed seven factors that may be examined to determine if 
a civil statute is so punitive it is criminal in nature.
232
 These factors include: 
[1] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation 
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will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 




Arguably, many of these factors apply to large civil fines assessed against 
corporations. The first two factors—whether a penalty is a disability or restrain and 
has historically been regarded as punishment—were answered affirmatively by the 
justices in Southern Union.
234
 The fourth and fifth elements—whether a sentence 
accomplishes deterrence and whether a sentence has criminal overlap—arguably 
also apply to multi-million dollar fines assessed against corporations.
235
 If a civil 
environmental statutory scheme has any kind of scienter requirements, all of the 
Kennedy factors would arguably apply to it.
236
 
However, the Supreme Court in Ward determined civil fines under the Clean 
Water Act are not criminal in nature.
237
 The ruling in Ward demonstrates environ-
mental defendants will be unsuccessful in arguing the Apprendi rule should apply 
to civil fines unless there is some sort of scienter requirement.
238
The general lack of 
the scienter element in civil actions under federal environmental statutes
239
 should 
prevent the Apprendi rule from being applied to civil environmental cases. This is 
encouraging because any kind of widespread application of the Apprendi rule in 
civil environmental cases would unnecessarily burden environmental enforcement 




Southern Union added a new layer of complexity to environmental crime cas-
es dramatically changing how certain cases will be litigated. These complications 
are particularly important because they have impacts for both federal and state en-
vironmental laws.
241
 As outlined previously, in environmental law these complica-
tions will be seen in five areas. 
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First, indictments and verdicts now will require greater specificity in particu-
lar facts relating to a criminal fine.
242
 Prosecutors will now have to consider using 
special verdict forms in per day fines, and defendants will have increasing reason to 
challenge every fact under an Alternative Fines Act fine.
243
 
Second, juries will make factual inferences at trial on the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, rather than the lower preponderance standard that was previously 
used by judges in sentencing.
244
 This will make it more difficult for the government 
to prove facts relating to elements of an environmental crime.
245
 Along with com-
plications in indictments and verdicts, this heightened burden of proof will proba-
bly make it far more complicated and difficult for prosecutors to get as large of 
criminal environmental fines.
246
 However, the government still has a veritable 
plethora of options in punishing defendants for environmental misconduct.
247
 As 
demonstrated previously in this article, in many cases the government can pursue 
either criminal or civil liability as well as corporate or individual liability.
248
 Smart 
prosecutors will always weigh these options to try and create maximum judicial 
efficiency and deterrence in environmental misconduct. Federal prosecutors have a 
high rate of conviction in environmental cases,
249
 and Southern Union should not 
greatly alter prosecutors’ conviction rates if prosecutors effectively use the other 
options that are available to them. 
Third, Southern Union will further complicate criminal trials that result in en-
vironmental fines, most likely resulting in more plea bargains.
250
 In this way, 
Southern Union is part of a larger trend favoring plea bargains in resolving criminal 
cases.
251
 This is also a bit of a double-edged sword for the criminal justice system. 
On one hand, it may result in greater judicial efficiency and smooth out some of the 
random effects that juries perpetuate.
252
 However, it also means defendants spend 
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less time in front of a neutral judge in favor of having a larger proportion of their 
cases being determined by what bargain the prosecutor is willing to strike.
253
 As the 
dissenters in Southern Union pointed out, this is a fundamental change in the 
American system of criminal justice.
254
 Southern Union just shows the perpetuation 
of this trend in the area of criminal fines.
255
 
Fourth, prosecutors have increased incentives to pursue individual liability, 
which can lead to personal fines or jail sentences, because of the additional compli-
cations Southern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines.
256
 These incentives 
will result in more effective environmental enforcement because individual en-
forcement results in more deterrence than corporate enforcement.
257
 
Finally, courts might have to address whether the doctrine has any application 
to environmental civil penalties.
258
 Any expansion of the Apprendi rule into the 
civil arena would be a large expansion of the doctrine.
259
 However, it seems unlike-
ly that an argument for such an expansion could occur, unless the argument was 
based on a civil environmental statute with a scienter requirement.
260
 
Despite all these increased complications in environmental crime, Southern 
Union is a means of guaranteeing fundamental rights to criminal defendants faced 
with a criminal fine. As such, Southern Union is a logical step towards guarantee-
ing fundamental jury rights in environmental cases. It is a reaffirmation of the fun-
damental Sixth Amendment right and the fact that the criminal stigma should only 
be imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
Southern Union, the Supreme Court was correct in making the law reflect the fact 
that there is certainly a far larger stigma in a $50,000,000 criminal fine than a 
$10,000 criminal fine. Even though Southern Union leads to a whole series of 
complications, the government still has many ways to prosecute environmental 
violations. One thing is certain. In the wake of Southern Union, both defendants 
and the government will have many new arguments and strategies to use in envi-
ronmental crime cases. 
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